Key Takeaways
- The single biggest myth about buying Korean securities is a rule that hasn’t existed since 2023. Korea abolished the Investment Registration Certificate (IRC)—the old pre-registration requirement with the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS)—on December 14, 2023. Every category on this page now runs on a lighter “investor ID” step at account opening instead of a certificate filed months in advance. That step means a legal entity identifier for institutions or a passport number for individuals.
- Ordinary and preferred shares of the same company can trade at wildly different prices, despite preferred stock actually carrying a small dividend edge over common. Korean preferred shares pay a modest dividend premium over their common-share counterparts and still trade at an average 45% discount, across more than 100 issuers. Samsung Electronics’ gap stood at 26% (down from 37%, on buyback expectations) as of early September 2026. Hyundai Motor’s common shares carried a premium of more than 50% over its preferred stock over the same period. That works out to roughly a 33% discount measured on the preferred side—narrower than the market average, despite the larger-sounding headline number.
- This site already has a deep piece on Korea’s exchange-traded fund (ETF) market structure. What it doesn’t cover is who can actually buy an ETF or exchange-traded note (ETN)—and that access story is mid-reform right now. The foreign omnibus-account channel—a way to trade through a global custodian without opening a Korean brokerage account—has covered ordinary shares only since 2025. An expansion to ETFs and ETNs was announced, but as of this piece’s most recent research (September 12, 2026), it wasn’t yet confirmed live.
- Two of the six products below are more reform than reality for an individual investor. Korea Treasury Bonds got a tax exemption in 2023 and an access overhaul in 2025. The ETF/ETN foreign omnibus-account expansion described above is a similar story. Both were built explicitly to serve institutional and index-tracking money, not a person placing a single retail order.
Contents
- The IRC is dead—act accordingly
- Ordinary vs. preferred shares: same company, different price
- ETFs and ETNs: who’s actually allowed to buy
- ELS/DLS: Korea’s structured note market
- Listed REITs: the simplest access story here
- Korea Treasury Bonds: cleared for takeoff, still taxiing
- KOSPI 200 derivatives: the same bar as everyone else
- The menu, laid flat
- Four traps
- Frequently asked questions.
A note on currency: won figures in this piece are also given in US dollars. The conversion rate is $1 = 1,341.24 KRW, the mid-market rate as of September 12, 2026 (source: XE.com). One exception: a historical loss figure in §4 carries the dollar amount reported at the time of that 2024–2025 event instead. Exchange rates move; treat every conversion here as an approximate, dated snapshot rather than a live figure.
1. The IRC is dead—act accordingly.
For about thirty years, a foreign investor buying a Korean stock had to first get a piece of paper: the Investment Registration Certificate (IRC). It was issued by the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS), Korea’s financial regulator, after a round of notarized documents. Anyone not physically in Korea also needed a standing proxy to file them. It was, by most accounts, the single most-cited hassle in foreign access to Korean markets.
It is gone. On December 14, 2023, Korea abolished the IRC requirement outright. In its place, a foreign investor opening an account at a Korean securities firm or bank now supplies one of two things. An institution supplies a Legal Entity Identifier—an internationally standardized ID for corporate entities. An individual simply supplies a passport number. No pre-filing with the FSS. No standing proxy requirement to get through the door. Investors who already held an IRC number from before the change must keep using that same number. They weren’t given a choice to switch, but nobody was forced to redo the registration process either.
This matters more than a footnote. A fair amount of investing-in-Korea content written before late 2023 is still online. Some of it still describes the IRC as a live requirement, product by product. It is worth stating plainly for this piece’s purposes: none of the six categories below has its own IRC-style pre-registration. The whole concept was retired for everyone at once. What varies from product to product is not whether you need to register in advance. It’s deposit minimums, education requirements, and which access channel is actually built out—plus, for one category on this list, a distribution channel that predates the reform and never really had foreigners in mind. Those specifics are what the rest of this piece is about. (For the step-by-step account-opening process itself, see this site’s guide to buying Korean stocks as a foreigner. That piece covers which documents, which broker steps, and what tax forms follow. This piece assumes that step is already done and covers what’s actually available to buy once it is.
2. Ordinary vs. preferred shares: same company, different price
Here’s a fact that reliably surprises new arrivals to Korean markets. Buy the ordinary shares of a large, well-known Korean company, and buy its preferred shares on the same day. You can end up paying close to half as much for the preferred line. That is true even though the preferred line actually carries a small dividend edge over the common shares, rather than a disadvantage.
The scale of this is not subtle. Korean preferred shares pay a modest dividend premium over common stock and still trade at an average 45% discount to their common-share counterparts. That gap holds across a set of more than 100 issuers, including Hyundai Motor and LG Chem. Samsung Electronics—Korea’s largest company by market value—had a preferred-to-common gap of 26% as of early September 2026. That is down from 37% a few months earlier. That narrowing rests on investor expectations that a broad shareholder-return program would include preferred-share purchases. As of the most recent reporting, that buyback had not been confirmed as running. Hyundai Motor’s common shares carried a premium of more than 50% over its preferred stock over the same period. That works out to roughly a 33% discount measured on the preferred side—narrower than the 45% cross-issuer average, despite the larger-sounding headline number. Hyundai did announce a buyback program in August 2026 that specifically targets its preferred stock. Nothing in the sourcing confirms whether that narrowed Hyundai’s own gap. A controlling family that wants to close either gap has the tools to do it; mostly, it has not bothered.
Why does the gap exist at all? Start with what a Korean preferred share actually is: economically, it behaves like non-voting common stock. The one exception is narrow and conditional. If the annual shareholder meeting votes not to pay the board-set preferred dividend, preferred holders gain voting rights. They keep those rights until the missed dividend is paid. Outside of that trigger, preferred holders have no say in a shareholder meeting most years, on anything.
Layer onto that a second, structural disadvantage. Minority shareholders in Korea—common or preferred—get no tag-along right if a controlling stake changes hands in a takeover. That means no guaranteed offer to buy out the rest of the shareholder base at the acquisition price. A preferred holder’s position is, by most assessments, the weaker of the two. Add a founding family with every incentive to keep voting power in common shares, while raising capital through preferred issuance instead of diluting control. A persistent, double-digit discount stops looking mysterious.
None of this is a reason to avoid preferred shares outright. A 45% average discount on a share that pays slightly more, not less, is exactly the asymmetry some investors specifically look for. It is a reason to understand what you’re buying, instead of assuming “preferred” carries the meaning it usually carries elsewhere. Elsewhere, that word means a class built around seniority and a contractual dividend claim—not around who gets a vote. Korean equities as a whole tend to trade cheap relative to comparable companies elsewhere—for reasons involving governance, capital allocation, and disclosure. See How to Read the Korea Discount as an Investor for the deeper question of why. The preferred-share gap is a concentrated, extreme version of that same underlying story.
Access-wise, there’s nothing special here. Same investor-ID account from §1, same trading day and sessions, same T+2 settlement, and same dividend withholding tax and capital gains treatment as the common line. The only practical catch is liquidity: many preferred lines trade a fraction of their common counterpart’s daily volume. That affects order sizing and tick-by-tick execution more than anything on this piece’s eligibility checklist. Thin volume is also what tends to attract the kind of regulatory attention this site covers in its piece on individual-stock trading suspensions.
3. ETFs and ETNs: who’s actually allowed to buy
This site has a full piece on how Korea’s ETF market works: How to Read Korea’s ETF Market: What Drives the Turnover. That piece covers liquidity providers, the indicative net asset value (iNAV) an ETF’s market price is supposed to track, and deviation ratios. It also covers the single-stock leveraged and inverse products that made 2026 such an eventful year for this market. Go there for that. This section covers a narrower, adjacent question that piece doesn’t: who is actually allowed to buy.
The baseline answer is almost anticlimactic. A foreign investor with a standard Korean brokerage account can buy or sell any ETF or ETN on the Korea Exchange (KRX). That is exactly like buying an ordinary share. That account needs nothing more than the passport-number step from §1. There has never been a separate ETF-specific or ETN-specific registration layered on top of general market access.
What’s actually in motion is a different, narrower access channel: the foreign omnibus account. This lets a foreign investor trade through a global custodian, or an overseas broker’s own name, without opening a Korean brokerage account at all. That channel is useful mainly for institutions and for retail investors reached through participating international brokers. Since the first such account opened in August 2025, this channel has covered ordinary listed shares only. In May 2026, the Financial Services Commission announced plans to expand it to cover ETFs and ETNs too. The rulemaking process started that June. A tax-treatment fix—how dividend withholding applies to ETF/ETN income held this way—is expected in the government’s July 2026 tax package. Reporting through late June 2026 pointed to a second-half 2026 rollout, once contract and systems work at participating overseas brokerages caught up. Notably, even once live, the expansion is reported to exclude leveraged and inverse ETFs/ETNs specifically. As of this piece’s publish date, nothing confirms that expansion has actually gone live yet.
Worth being precise about what that gap does and doesn’t mean. A foreign investor who can’t yet use the omnibus channel for ETFs is not a foreign investor who can’t buy ETFs. Anyone with a direct Korean brokerage account has always had access to the full ETF and ETN lineup. The omnibus reform is about making one indirect route catch up to where direct access already stood.
One structural point about ETNs specifically is worth flagging here, since it is genuinely a different risk than anything an ETF carries. An ETN is unsecured debt of the securities firm that issued it. It does not hold the underlying assets it tracks—the issuer simply promises to pay out a return linked to a reference index. If that issuer ran into serious financial trouble, the ETN could become worthless regardless of how its underlying index performed. An ETF holds the actual assets (or a representative basket) in trust. A fund manager’s insolvency does not wipe out the fund’s assets the same way. It’s a distinction that matters more in a stress scenario than in ordinary trading, but it’s the kind of thing worth knowing before it matters.
4. ELS/DLS: Korea’s structured note market
Equity-Linked Securities (ELS) and Derivative-Linked Securities (DLS) are structured notes that pay a return based on the performance of a reference index or basket. They often carry a knock-in barrier that converts an otherwise attractive coupon into a principal-loss position if the underlying falls far enough. Both are a genuinely large part of Korea’s retail investment market. They’re also the one product on this list where “can a foreign investor actually buy this” does not have a clean answer.
Start with scale. Korea’s top 10 securities firms by ELS issuance sold 2.28 trillion won (roughly $1.7 billion) worth of ELS products in the single month from March 25 to April 24, 2026. That is up 39% from 1.64 trillion won (about $1.22 billion) in the same window a year earlier. The number of distinct products issued in that window rose to 933, from 686. That is a snapshot of one month at the ten largest issuers, not a full-market total. But it’s a snapshot of a market that was, at that specific moment, growing fast.
These products can only be issued by Korean securities firms and banks that meet the regulator’s capital and risk-management standards. In practice, that means every ELS or DLS you’ll encounter is a domestic product, even when its reference index is foreign (Hang Seng China Enterprises, EURO STOXX 50, and the S&P 500 are common underlyings). The distribution channel matters here more than for anything else on this list, because it has had real regulatory attention over the past two years. After roughly 4.6 trillion won (about $3.2 billion, as reported at the time) in retail losses tied to Hang Seng China Enterprises-linked ELS in early 2024, the Financial Services Commission moved in February 2025 to restrict bank sales of ELS. Sales are now limited to specially designated “hub branches”—an estimated 5–10% of the roughly 3,900 branches Korea’s five major commercial banks operate—with physically separated sales areas and experienced staff required. Brokerage firms got no equivalent restriction. The regulator’s stated view is that brokerage customers are already sufficiently informed about what they’re buying.
That reform tells you something about who these products are built for, even without a definitive answer on foreign eligibility. No source turned up in researching this piece states outright whether a non-resident foreign individual can or can’t buy an ELS or DLS through a Korean brokerage account. What is clear is the shape of the market around that question. It is a domestic-suitability framework, tightened specifically in response to a mis-selling episode involving Korean retail clients. It is distributed through bank branches and brokerage floors built for a Korea-resident customer base. If you’re a foreign investor specifically interested in ELS/DLS exposure, the honest answer is to ask a specific broker directly rather than assume either way. This is not a product category where a general access rule reliably applies.
5. Listed REITs: the simplest access story here
After four sections of caveats, here’s a clean one. Twenty-four REITs (real estate investment trusts) are listed on the Korea Exchange as of this piece’s publish window. They trade exactly like ordinary shares—the same investor-ID account, no separate registration. No product-specific restriction turned up anywhere in researching this piece.
The sector’s assets have grown quickly, even as the headcount has bounced around a little—the way any listed segment’s roster does as individual issuers list, merge, or delist. There were 25 REITs as of 2025 and 24 as of this piece’s research. What’s climbed steadily regardless is the money. Combined market capitalization of Korea’s listed REITs crossed 10 trillion won (about $7.5 billion) for the first time in early 2026, a milestone reached roughly 25 years after Korea’s REIT framework was introduced. That is up from about 8.36 trillion won (about $6.2 billion) in 2025. Four REITs—SK REIT, Lotte REIT, ESR Kendall Square REIT, and Hanwha REIT—had individually crossed the 1-trillion-won mark by that milestone. As of the end of 2024, the listed-REIT sector’s average annual dividend yield stood at roughly 7.5% on an offering-price basis, or 8.1% on a market-price basis. Alongside a roughly 0.8x average price-to-book ratio, that combination reads less like a growth trade and more like what the vehicle is built to be: income.
That income orientation is not left to a board’s discretion the way an ordinary dividend policy works. Korea’s REIT Act, Article 28, requires a Korean REIT to pay out 90% or more of its distributable profit as dividends. That’s a mandatory floor written into the law creating the vehicle. A February 2024 amendment softened one edge of that rule: REITs can now exclude cumulative unrealized property-value losses when calculating the maximum payout for a given year. That means a paper markdown on a building’s book value does not automatically cap what the REIT can distribute out of actual net lease income.
If you’re comparing this to REIT access in other markets, the distribution mechanics are Korea-specific, but the buying mechanics are not. This is, product for product, the closest thing on this menu to buying the stock outright.
6. Korea Treasury Bonds: cleared for takeoff, still taxiing
Korea Treasury Bonds (KTBs)—the Korean government’s own sovereign debt—have had two genuine reforms aimed squarely at foreign investors. Both are worth knowing about, even though neither one was built with an individual investor’s order ticket in mind.
First, the tax fix. Since January 1, 2023, non-resident individuals and foreign corporations without a Korean permanent establishment have been exempt from withholding tax on interest and capital gains. That exemption covers both KTBs and Bank of Korea Monetary Stabilization Bonds. Second, the access fix. Effective January 24, 2025, the Financial Supervisory Service scrapped a requirement that offshore bond investors trade Korean treasuries fund-by-fund through separate securities accounts. Global custodians and asset managers can now trade, hold, settle, and report these positions under their own name, on an omnibus basis. That is on behalf of everyone they represent.
Neither reform happened in a vacuum. Both were built explicitly to help Korea qualify for FTSE Russell’s World Government Bond Index (WGBI). That is a major benchmark that determines where a meaningful slice of global fixed-income index money automatically flows. Here’s the detail worth getting right: Korea’s WGBI inclusion is not a single date. It is a phase-in, in eight equal monthly tranches, starting with the April 2026 index profile and completing with the November 2026 index profile. As this piece publishes in mid-September 2026, that phase-in is roughly two-thirds of the way through. It isn’t finished and won’t be finished for about two more months.
Both the tax exemption and the omnibus-account reform above were built for institutions—global custodians, asset managers, and primary dealers moving index-tracking money. Neither was built for a person placing a single retail order for one bond. A retail-direct channel does exist for individuals in Korea: a retail-purpose treasury bond program, sold monthly since June 2024. It runs through dedicated accounts at a handful of banks and securities firms. It was extended to cover retirement accounts (DC and IRP plans) starting in September 2026. But that channel is built around Korean-resident dedicated accounts and Korean retirement plans. Nothing found in researching this piece establishes that a non-resident foreign individual can use it. If you want Korean sovereign duration in a portfolio you manage yourself, a KTB-linked bond ETF is the more realistic route. That is a better bet for a foreign investor than trying to buy a bond directly. (That is a market-structure question; this site’s ETF piece is the place for it, not repeated here).
There’s also a genuine offshore alternative worth knowing about. It applies if direct KTB exposure was never really the point, and dollar-pay Korea-linked credit is what you actually wanted. Korea’s state policy banks issue conventional USD-denominated global bonds that clear through the same Euroclear/DTC infrastructure as any other dollar Eurobond. No Korean investor-ID step is required at all. The Export-Import Bank of Korea issued $2 billion in such USD-denominated bonds on July 13, 2026, split evenly between 3- and 5-year maturities. That came on top of a broader $3.5 billion foreign-currency bond package announced that January. The package included the bank’s first-ever “AI Transition Support Bond” and “Green Bond.” Worth being precise about what you’d actually own there: that is quasi-sovereign policy-bank credit, not the Korean sovereign itself. It is a real distinction for anyone using it as a KTB substitute, rather than as its own asset class.
7. KOSPI 200 derivatives: the same bar as everyone else
KOSPI 200 futures and options—derivatives on Korea’s benchmark large-cap index—are the one product category on this list with a genuine entry bar. That bar is not foreign-investor-specific—it is the same bar every domestic retail trader clears.
Since a Q4 2019 reform, a “non-professional investor” opening a Korean derivatives account faces a minimum deposit requirement. That’s 10 million won (about $7,460) for futures and options trading, or 20 million won (about $14,910) to trade all categories of exchange derivatives. That comes with a minimum of one hour of prior education and three hours of mock trading before a first real trade. No source was found in researching this piece that describes a separate rule for foreign individual investors—easier or harder. The plain reading is that a foreign investor opening a Korean derivatives account clears the same deposit-and-education bar a domestic retail trader does. That happens through the same brokerage process.
Opening a dedicated Korean derivatives account—or clearing that deposit bar—might be more than you want to deal with. If so, there’s a real offshore alternative most guides to Korean markets don’t mention: the Eurex/KRX Link. KOSPI 200 futures, Mini-KOSPI 200 futures, and KOSPI 200 weekly options trade on Eurex—the European derivatives exchange. They’re fully fungible with their corresponding KRX-listed contracts during European and US trading hours through ordinary international brokers. No Korean brokerage account, no KRX-side deposit-and-education process. It is, as far as offshore workarounds on this list go, close to as clean as they get.
8. The menu, laid flat
This piece covers six product categories—a useful cross-section rather than Korea’s entire tradable universe. (Warrants, corporate bonds, KOSDAQ-specific quirks, real estate funds, and OTC derivatives aren’t on this list—they’re candidates for a future piece). Within those six, there’s one access story each. None of them are gated by anything called an IRC anymore.
- Ordinary and preferred shares—full access through a standard investor-ID account; the only real variable is which line you buy and at what discount.
- ETFs and ETNs—full direct access has always existed. The foreign omnibus (indirect) channel is still catching up, and its completion is unconfirmed as of this piece’s research.
- ELS/DLS—issued only by Korean institutions, distributed through a domestic-suitability framework; foreign individual eligibility genuinely unresolved by public sourcing.
- Listed REITs—full access, identical to an ordinary share; the purchase is simple, and the complexity sits entirely in the statutory payout rule.
- KTBs—tax-cleared and access-reformed at the institutional level. A retail-direct channel exists but is built for Korean residents, with no confirmed foreign-investor access. A bond ETF or an offshore quasi-sovereign USD bond are the realistic substitutes for a foreign investor.
- KOSPI 200 derivatives—same deposit-and-education bar as a domestic retail trader; a genuine, account-free offshore alternative exists via Eurex.
9. Four traps
Trap 1: Assuming you need an Investment Registration Certificate before you can buy anything. This was true for roughly thirty years and hasn’t been true since December 14, 2023. If a guide, forum post, or broker onboarding document mentions an “IRC” as a current requirement, treat it as out of date—that rule was retired, and nothing stricter took its place.
Trap 2: Treating a Korean “preferred share” like its US namesake. In a US context, “preferred stock” usually signals seniority in liquidation and a fixed, contractual dividend claim. Those are features investors typically pay up for, rather than discount. A Korean preferred share carries a real dividend edge over common (see §2), but none of the liquidation-seniority baggage the word implies elsewhere. It also carries a vote that only shows up if the company skips a dividend payment. Same label, structurally different instrument—that gap is a meaningful part of why the 45% average discount exists at all.
Trap 3: Assuming the ETF/ETN omnibus-account expansion means foreigners couldn’t buy ETFs before. They could, and can, through a direct Korean brokerage account—that access predates this reform entirely. What is actually catching up is one indirect, custodian-intermediated channel, mostly relevant to institutions and to retail investors reached through specific overseas brokers.
Trap 4: Assuming a KTB tax exemption or access reform means an individual can easily buy one bond. Both of Korea’s recent Treasury bond reforms were aimed at index-tracking institutional money chasing WGBI inclusion; retail order flow was never the target. If you want Korean sovereign exposure without institutional infrastructure, look at a bond ETF instead of trying to buy a single KTB directly.
10. FAQ
Do I need an Investment Registration Certificate to invest in Korea? No. The IRC system was abolished December 14, 2023. You’ll open an account using a passport number (individuals) or a Legal Entity Identifier (institutions) instead.
Why do Korean preferred shares trade so much cheaper than common shares? Mainly because they’re functionally non-voting stock with no tag-along protection in a takeover, held by controlling families specifically to raise capital without diluting voting control—an average 45% discount across more than 100 issuers as of September 2026.
Can I buy Korean ETFs and ETNs as a foreign investor? Yes, directly, through a standard Korean brokerage account, with no separate registration. A parallel indirect channel (foreign omnibus accounts through a global custodian) is being expanded to cover ETFs and ETNs but wasn’t confirmed live as of this piece’s publish date.
Can I buy Korean ELS or DLS structured notes as a non-resident? Unclear from public sourcing. These are bank- and brokerage-distributed products built around Korea-resident suitability rules, tightened after a 2024–2025 mis-selling episode. Ask a specific broker before assuming either way.
Are Korean REITs open to foreign investors? Yes, with no special restriction—they trade exactly like ordinary listed shares.
Can I buy Korea Treasury Bonds directly as an individual foreign investor? No source found in researching this piece identifies a legal bar. Korea does have a retail-direct KTB channel (a retail-purpose treasury bond program, since June 2024, extended to retirement accounts in September 2026), but it is built around Korean-resident dedicated accounts and Korean retirement plans—no source confirms a non-resident foreign individual can use it. A KTB-linked ETF is the more realistic route.
Do foreign investors get easier terms on KOSPI 200 futures and options? No indication of that in public sourcing—the deposit and education requirements described here appear to apply the same way they do to a domestic retail trader. An offshore route via Eurex-listed, KRX-fungible contracts exists if a Korean derivatives account isn’t worth opening.
Last updated: September 14, 2026
Disclaimer: This article is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute investment, legal, or tax advice. Product eligibility rules, deposit thresholds, and tax treatment described here are current as of this piece’s publish date and are subject to change by Korean regulators without notice. Several points in this piece—foreign-investor eligibility for ELS/DLS and the live status of the ETF/ETN foreign omnibus-account expansion—could not be confirmed with a definitive primary source as of this piece’s September 2026 research and are stated as such. Confirm current rules with a licensed broker or your own tax and legal advisers before making any investment decision. Seoul Market Brief does not recommend any specific security, fund, or transaction.